As the Russia – Ukraine war enters its fourth year, the discussion in Washington and European capitals has largely shifted to supplying Ukraine with Tomahawk cruise missiles. These long-range precision weapons made in the United States could completely change the strategic calculus of the war by striking targets deep behind the frontlines. The real conversation isn’t “if” these weapons change the game, but rather how they will change the game in terms of military, political and psychological dimensions.
Tomahawk cruise missile
The Tomahawk cruise missile, developed by Raytheon in the 1970s and repeatedly updated since, is a subsonic missile (≈880 km/h) and a key weapon in the strike arsenals of the United States and allies. The latest versions (Block IV/Block V) reportedly have ranges of about 1,000–1,500 miles (≈1,609–2,414 km) with about 450 kg (1,000 Lb) conventional unitary or penetrating warheads, and use INS/GPS, terrain-contour matching and in-flight data-link retargeting to achieve meter-level accuracy at the terminal phase. Launched from Navy surface and subsurface vessels (and able to be launched from land), Tomahawks can be retargeted in flight, loiter for multiple targets, and put nearly all of European Russia including Moscow, St. Petersburg and large military-industrial production facilities within reach at those ranges. Reported U.S. unit costs are in the range of $1.3–$2.0 million per missile.
Tomahawks would provide Ukraine with a significant advancement in operational reach: their deep-strike capability would allow Kyiv to target rear logistics hubs, airbases, supply depots, command nodes and rail junctions that presently rely on distance for protection, thereby disrupting Moscow’s operational pace and complicating reinforcement and sustainment. Tomahawks are delivered from ships or submarines and are re-targetable in flight, allowing them to target time-sensitive, fleeting targets such as fuel trains, ammunition dumps, or command posts while limiting risk to Ukrainian aircraft and ground forces through loiter capability and retasking in-flight. Moreover, under the notion of immediate battlefield effects, presence of true deep-strike cruise missiles is a deterrence force multiplier: it provides the credible threat of strikes on high-value Russian infrastructure, elevating political and economic costs for Moscow and strengthening Kyiv’s position in negotiations, even if it does not necessarily alter frontline attrition on its own.
Limitations and Risks of Tomahawk Missile
Tomahawk missiles are powerful, but they are not a solution to all problems. Given Russia’s dense, layered air-defense network (S-300, S-400, Pantsir, and long-range surface-to-air missile). Their sub-supersonic speed also makes them somewhat vulnerable, especially when fired in mass. Tomahawks are also expensive (approximately $1.5 million–2 million each), so sustained firing would quickly drain Western inventories without getting new missiles produced quickly, and they rely on GPS/INS and data links for employment that can be degraded through jamming or other electronic warfare tools. The biggest political risk posed by Tomahawks is escalation (Russia has warned that long-range strikes would be a major provocation) and potential escalation may manifest itself through further missile strikes against Ukrainian cities or asymmetric measures (e.g., cyberattacks, disruption to energy networks in Europe). Ultimately, attrition rates, salvo sizing, and the quality of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and targeting will determine if Tomahawks produce decisive operational effects or merely raise operational costs and risks for Ukraine and its supporters.
Industrial factors:
At about $1-2 million a missile (and more on export markets), Tomahawk cruise missiles are expensive to mass-consume and supplying Ukraine mass would present distinct sustainment and resupply challenges; the U.S. Navy and the industrial base are investing in the Block V upgrades (including updated navigation and an anti-ship capability), but Raytheon is producing maybe 400-500 missiles per year, and so the U.S. would require congressional approval and the Navy would need to consider operational readiness for any stocks diverted from U.S. inventory for the Ukrainians. This means that allies (the UK, Australia, etc.) would also theoretically need to pool their stocks or synchronize future procurement of T-hawks to sustain initial inventory flows, without this stressing any one partner country. Longer-term support would depend more on ramping production levels and political will, however. Because of cost and stock issues, partners in the West would also look to other cheaper, complementary options cheaper cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and coastal or land-based launched munitions to preserve the Tomahawks for high-value, long-range missions. Budget lines in 2025 show continued procurement and modernization budgets, but these considerations of industrial capacity and political constraints will drive the missiles deliver first to Ukraine and then be used in any longer-term, sustainable capacity.
NATO’s Strategic Calculus
For NATO, the key challenge goes beyond Ukraine’s operational shortfalls, which are clearly defined, to the more delicate task of managing escalation. Supplying Tomahawk cruise missiles would enable Kyiv to attack Russian territory, potentially merging defensive assistance for Ukraine with offensive operations. This would create new strategic and diplomatic headaches since long-range precision capabilities risk direct retaliation by Russia, and/or expanding the geographical conflict. Some Western analysts and policymakers have proposed a solution based on conditionality: Tomahawks could be supplied to Ukraine with the explicit condition that Ukrainian forces do not use them to attack targets outside of Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine, including Crimea. This would enable NATO to state that support was still consistent with NATO’s defense policy commitment. Although an approach that attempts to place strict geographic restrictions (or use limitations) on a high-precision weapon with an autonomous lead-system is challenging to implement and police from a technical perspective and is even less viable from a political standpoint. Despite lacking specific action-reaction thresholds geographies and transparency, NATO, like Russia, remains unwilling to escalate the conflict; NATO is rightly highly corroborative about crossing a ‘red line in this era of strategic ambiguity, and actual military intervention.
The Tomahawk missile would substantially increase Ukraine’s strategic reach, providing precision deep-strike capability that has the potential to change Russia’s defensive calculus. However, such an act would have high costs, logistical requirements, and raise serious escalation risks. If tomahawks were deployed, it would require tight coordination with intelligence, defense, and diplomacy, to prevent escalation of conflict from occurring uncontrollably. Overall, the question of a tomahawk supply has less to do with the weapons themselves but how to manage deterrence and stability. However, if approved, tomahawks could become a serious turning point in the dangerous direction of trajectory of the war.
