Since the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Pakistan’s internal security landscape has become increasingly precarious, with the evolving Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerging as the principal threat. Originally a predominantly Pashtun insurgency, the TTP has significantly broadened its operational, organizational, and propaganda reach—an expansion largely driven by Pakistan’s persistent failure to address development issues and its heavy-handed, autocratic approach to sub-national identity grievances.
TTP’s Spring Offensives and Propaganda Warfare
In March 2022, the TTP launched its first spring offensive, “Al-Badr,” but paused due to pressure from the Afghan Taliban. Two years later, it announced a new offensive, “Al-Khandaq,” marking a significant escalation in both frequency and intensity of attacks. Alongside this, the TTP has also launched a sophisticated propaganda campaign titled the “Al-Khandaq Updates,” aiming to amplify its reach and influence through the sharing of news bulletins and attack footage. Notably, the group now claims to target only security forces, attempting to exploit state-society divides and present itself as a viable alternative to the Pakistani state.
Organizational Revamp and Expansion
The TTP’s operational evolution is supported by annual reorganizations modeled after the Afghan Taliban’s framework. In January 2025, the group publicly named its 17-member consultative council (shura) for the first time, signaling attempts at increased transparency and cohesion. A notable development has been the expansion of TTP’s shadow provinces in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from three to seven and the addition of two new military zones, reflecting its growing influence in these regions.
TTP’s Foray into Punjab
Traditionally rooted in Pashtun areas, the TTP is now aggressively expanding into Punjab. In the recent past, Pakistani law enforcement has reportedly foiled at least 14 TTP attack attempts in Punjab. The group has released videos of its cadre members in Dera Ghazi Khan and Mianwali and circulated an audio statement from its Darul Ifta Mufti Nadeem Darvesh in Punjabi, appealing for local support to establish a Taliban-style emirate.
To facilitate its expansion, the TTP’s media wing, Al-Umar Media, has begun disseminating propaganda in the Punjabi language via Telegram and other messaging platforms. The group has also issued warnings to local populations against forming anti-Taliban militias, framing such efforts as government attempts to divide civilians. Additionally, the TTP has absorbed former factions of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Ghazi Force, further broadening its ethnic and geographical base and challenging the perception of being a solely Pashtun movement.
Technological Adaptation and Propaganda
Drones and Urban Warfare
The “Al-Khandaq” offensive notably utilized drones for attacks, a tactic previously associated with advanced militant groups. TTP-related social media shared videos of a drone dropping a payload on a military vehicle, though the location was unspecified. In 2024, factions linked to the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group reportedly conducted at least six drone strikes against security forces in North Waziristan, but the group has not officially claimed responsibility. Security forces attribute these strikes to the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group. The adoption of drones marks a significant escalation, making such attacks harder to counter in densely populated areas.
Targeting the Psyche
TTP’s propaganda, amplified via social media and messaging apps in multiple languages, seeks to maximize psychological impact, shape public perception, and recruit new members. By framing itself as pro-civilian and anti-establishment, the group exploits societal grievances and state failures.
Pakistan’s Response and Structural Challenges
Counterterrorism and Diplomacy
Pakistan has responded with military operations, such as the “Al-Badr Operation,” but the persistence of TTP sanctuaries in Afghanistan requires a blend of security measures and diplomatic engagement. Recent diplomatic outreach to the Afghan Taliban aims to decouple security issues from broader bilateral relations, fostering cooperation on trade and connectivity to build trust and address cross-border militancy.
Societal and Governance Gaps
A purely military response is unlikely to yield lasting results. The failure to deliver on promises of development and integration in the newly merged districts (formerly FATA) has created fertile ground for TTP recruitment. The military’s hardline stance and neglect of civilian concerns have further alienated local populations, thus eroding trust and fueling extremist narratives.
Conclusion
The Pakistan Army has failed to address civilian grievances, particularly among Pashtuns and in the Newly Merged Districts, fueling support for the TTP’s expansion. Its preference for autocratic control over democratic solutions, combined with neglect of local development, has deepened public discontent. Rising extremism and poverty continue to drive youth toward militancy. The army’s reliance on supporting militant groups to maintain power is backfiring, and public trust in the government is rapidly eroding.
