The European Union’s new SAFE program, worth almost €150 billion, is not only about money. It has a major political purpose. For years, Europe’s defense has largely relied on NATO and U.S. strength. With SAFE, the EU is clearly signaling that it does not want to remain a sub-partner in global security but rather wants to see if Europe’s substantial economy can translate into actual military capabilities something Europe has struggled to do since the Cold War.
Russia’s war in Ukraine, now in its fourth year, has depleted Europe’s munitions and clarified vulnerability. Meanwhile, there is uncertainty about the long-term U.S. commitment to fully defend Europe, particularly as America pivots increasingly toward China. This leaves European leaders with a question they have been perpetually unwilling to answer: if the U.S. support diminishes, can Europe defend itself? The SAFE program is the answer.
Russia as the Catalyst:
From a geopolitical perspective, SAFE is best understood as a tactical response to Russia’s war of attrition. Political conditions and aggressiveness have reframed Europe’s understanding of the threat. Countries to the EU’s east Poland, the Baltics, Romania view SAFE as paramount to rearmament and deterrence. Poland alone has requested €45 billion, roughly about one-third of the fund. It is possible to view Poland as the military power in Europe’s front line.
Many in the Kremlin would view SAFE with some concern. It also provides insight into Europe’s longer-term intentions. Europe is preparing to fund not just Ukraine’s survival but to fund the re-establishment of something like European (defense) costs, period. Moscow has often taken advantage of Europe’s dependency on the U.S. and fragmented defense markets. A pooled fund at the EU level undermines that vulnerability. If the fund is made operational, it could raise the costs of Russian escalation and lengthen Moscow’s overall calculus in Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea.
The Transatlantic Dimension
SAFE also addresses the changing transatlantic balance. For decades, U.S. presidents have implored Europe, “Spend more!” in support of defense, but European spending has only improved sporadically. By pooling €150 billion through EU borrowing, Brussels is sending a meaningful signal to Washington that Europe is prepared to assume additional burden-sharing. However, SAFE could also generate friction within NATO. Washington may not mind the additional spending but may find the duplication of effort troubling. The U.S. defense industry historically a major contributor to Europe now faces new barriers as SAFE requires that 65% of procurement value comes from the EU, EFTA, or Ukraine. While that industrial safeguard is sensible within a European autonomy paradigm, it may be perceived in Washington as a protectionist shift that marginalizes American defense companies.
The geopolitical balancing act for Brussels is complicated: claiming autonomy without jeopardizing NATO solidarity. To the extent that SAFE enhances capability in Europe while being interoperable with NATO, it can be a benefit to NATO. To the extent that SAFE causes fragmentation and distrust, it is more likely to undermine transatlantic unity at a crucial inflection point worldwide in terms of strategic competition.
The UK Question
Post-Brexit Britain can be viewed from yet another geopolitical lens. London formerly led military power in Europe but is no longer an EU decision-making member. SAFE allows for limited UK involvement by authorizing sub-contractions, so if UK contributions are capped to an allowable percentage which attempts to prevent dominance. This issue reflects the broader tension of the EU-UK relationship. On one hand, both sides are aware of the necessity for cooperation against regulators, but on the other, Brussels is very intent on preserving the center of gravity in the EU. The strategic challenge posed by SAFE is this; for the UK, there are two options: 1) sterile entry into EU aligned defense project mechanisms or 2) getting kicked out as continental Europe builds its own military-industrial complex.
Ukraine’s Integration into the European Defense System
The most geopolitically notable aspect of SAFE is that it names Ukraine’s defense industry a beneficiary. So naturally, Ukrainian firms can participate in EU procurement consortia, safeguarding that Ukraine’s battle-tested industrial base is systematically embedded into Europe’s defense procurement systems. This is not merely a show of wartime solidarity it is a deft pre-accession policy. SAFE asserts Ukraine’s EU accession path by conditioning its defense sector to the European way of operating, while inviting the EU to deploy Ukraine’s innovative wartime experience, not least its drones, electronic warfare and missiles. Geopolitically, this locks out Russia and locks in Ukraine.
Internal Divisions: North-South, East-West
Although SAFE has been considered a breakthrough, it serves to shine a light on Europe’s internal divisions. Eastern members closest to Russia are pushing for maximum levels of borrowing to jumpstart their rearms. Southern states like Italy see SAFE as a chance to share debt but simultaneously modernize their militaries, which are now long outdated. Northern fiscal hawks -Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands- are cautious and are and wary of tying themselves to obligations where there could be future precedents set for permanent debt mutualization to the whole EU. These divisions matter geopolitically. If frontline states push ahead at full speed whilst the wealthier northern members are indecisive, Europe will likely face a situation of asymmetric capabilities as well as solidarity. Hence, SAFE is a test of Europe’s political cohesion, as much as it is to be considered a financial engineering exercise.
SAFE in the Global Security Order
Beyond Europe, SAFE has ripple effects. For China, a more militarized EU will complicate its alternative strategy of courting European neutrality in the U.S.-China rivalry. For Russia, SAFE raises the long-term cost of its confrontation with the West. For others in the Global South, SAFE is an example of leveraging financial integration into a collective security agreement that could inspire other regional blocs.
The structure of the global arms market might also shift. With €150 billion allocated for mostly European suppliers, SAFE could have significant effects on EU defense companies and improve their competitiveness against non-EU firms worldwide. In the long-term, SAFE could rebalance the U.S.-European duopoly in global arms exports and create a stronger third “pillar” of arms exports alongside the U.S. and Russia.
Conclusion: Europe’s Defining Security Experiment
Geopolitically, SAFE is Europe’s most radical experiment in international security integration since NATO’s inception. It fuses finance, industry, and defense strategy into a single instrument to project power outwardly and cohesion inwardly. If it succeeds, Europe will be more autonomous, more resilient, and a more credible global actor. If it fails, perceptions of Europe will be of a fragmented continent who cannot translate economic power to strategic power.
Ultimately, SAFE is not about weapons or loans, it is Europe’s response to a changing global order. Whether or not Europe shifts from a consumer of security to a producer of stability will shape not only the future of EU Defense, but the balance of power across Eurasia.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ’s):
Q: What is the EU’s SAFE program?
A: The EU’s SAFE (Support for Ammunition and Future Equipment) program is a €150 billion defense fund designed to strengthen European military capabilities, reduce dependence on the U.S., and integrate Ukraine’s defense industry into Europe’s security framework.
Q: Why is the SAFE program geopolitically significant?
A: SAFE reshapes Europe’s defense by pooling EU funds, countering Russia, balancing NATO relations, and fostering defense autonomy, making it one of Europe’s most ambitious security projects since NATO’s founding.
